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THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND GRAY MARKET GOODS
JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY*
The spiralling growth rate of international trade has been accom-
panied by the importation and sale of gray market goods, a recurring
problem and subject of considerable concern and controversy.1 The la-
bel "gray market" is applied to those goods which are manufactured
abroad and then sold in the United States, outside authorized channels
of distribution. 2 The consumer who pays $100 for a famous name
brand imported watch that usually sells for $200 has probably pur-
chased a gray market item.
Gray market goods are not counterfeit. They are genuine goods
which usually bear a trademark, but which are generally sold at prices
considerably less than those charged by the United States distributor.
While the consumer is typically pleased with the financial savings in-
volved in the purchase of a gray market item, the United States dis-
tributor is not because, in effect, a sale has been lost. If enough sales
are lost, the distibutor may eventually go out of business.
Since a major focus of United States competition policy is to bene-
fit the consumer, it is unclear whether the importation and sale of
gray market goods violates United States law. The presence of gray
market goods can be viewed as either an assault on the competitive
process or as an enhancement of it. This article considers the tension
between the equities for the distributor and the efficiencies for the con-
sumer when gray market goods are sold. It then examines the status of
gray market goods within the framework of United States competition
policy.
* J.D. (cum laude), Suffolk University Law School, 1975; LL.M., New York Univer-
sity Law School, 1981; Assistant Professor of Law, Hunter College; Adjunct Associate
Professor, Fordham Law School.
1. See, e.g., Crandle, Closing the Door on Pirates and Bad Apples, CUSTOMs TODAY,
Spring 1983, at 9, 11; Lewin, Gray Area for Imports, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at D2,
col. 1. For a historical account of the problem see Vandenburgh, The Problem of Impor-
tation of Trademarked Goods is not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 707
(1959).
2. For a discussion of how other legal systems deal with this problem, see Takamatsu,
Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV.
433 (1982).
3. See Antitrust Symposium: Purposes and Goals of Antitrust, 27 ST. Loulis U.L.J.
287 (1983); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1140 (1981).
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I. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
There is nothing novel about the importation of genuine goods in
contravention of an existing exclusive distributorship.' What is new is
the quantity and frequency of their importation. What was once a cot-
tage industry has become big business with the growth of international
trade. In the past, these goods were referred to as "parallel imports,"
and included items such as watches, cameras and perfumes. Today, the
list has expanded to include a wide range of consumer items such as
electronic equipment, televisions, microwave ovens, stereo equipment,
tires, glassware, dinnerware and crystal.5 Although there may be stylis-
tic differences between the overseas articles and those intended for the
American market, they are essentially the same goods.
One of the major factors which has contributed to the growth of
the gray market is the strength of the dollar against fluctuating curren-
cies.' In the camera industry, probably the most vulnerable target of
gray market goods, the gray market business has been compared to the
commodity exchange since dealers watch foreign exchange rates and
then traffic the cameras accordingly.
7
The two most common situations in which the problem arises are:
(1) when United States subsidiaries are exclusive distributors for for-
eign corporations and (2) when United States companies authorize for-
eign producers to manufacture and sell goods in foreign markets with
the understanding that the goods will not be sold in the United
States.' In both situations gray market dealers purchase the goods
from middlemen abroad, import them into the United States and then
sell them at prices which are usually lower than those charged by an
American distributor.9
4. See Vandenburgh, supra note 1.
5. Blumstein, Seiko Wins Order to Get Alexander's to Change Its Ads, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 6, 1982, at D1, col. 3.
6. Why Camera Prices are Falling, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 61, 64.
7. Id.
8. See Brief of Amici Curiae (Trademark Group of the American Association of Ex-
porters and Importers, American Watch Association, Bojorquez Mexican Food Coalition
and Jewelers of America, Inc.), attachment B (Letter from Steven Kersner to Darrel
Kast (May 14, 1982)), Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
9. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 9, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (cameras
sold by gray market dealers cost $150 to $200 less than the prices charged by the United
States distributor).
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II. COMPETITION ISSUES
A. Benefits and Burdens of Gray Market Goods
By stimulating price competition, gray market goods enhance in-
trabrand competition.10 The consumer receives low-priced goods, a re-
sult which ostensibly benefits consumer welfare. If gray market goods
were excluded from the United States, the American market would be
insulated from price competition. This could cause the domestic con-
sumer to be the victim of price discrimination due to the payment of
artificially high prices instead of world market prices checked by com-
petition.' The fact that gray market goods cost less in foreign markets,
however, may not be indicative of anti-competitive price discrimina-
tion. Instead, it might simply reflect the economic realities of a given
foreign market. Cost as well as price may be less in the foreign market;
a seller may not need expensive advertising, warranty service or prod-
uct liability insurance in order to compete with other sellers.12
On the burden side of the equation, consumers are deceived when
expected warranties or services are not provided by gray market deal-
ers. Consumers also experience a sense of diminished expectation when
they purchase high quality goods at a high price in prestige stores, only
to find the same goods sold in discount outlets one year later."3 Finally,
consumers' long run interests may be affected if the penetration of
gray market goods causes unemployment in a domestic industry. 4
10. Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the
same generic product ... and is the primary concern of antitrust law. The
extreme example of a deficiency of interbrand competition is monopoly,
where there is only one manufacturer. In contrast, intrabrand competition is
the competition between the distributors-wholesale or retail-of the prod-
uct of a particular manufacturer.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
11. The Robinson-Patman Amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13(a)-(f) (1982) proscribes the practice of price discrimination. When sellers receive a
different margin of price over cost from different purchasers, anti-competitive price dis-
crimination has occurred. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 253-54 (1980).
12. See 1978 A.B.A. SEC. OF PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L., COMMITTEE REPORTS at
76.
13. For example, in many cases if a consumer invests a substantial sum of money in
the purchase of a prestige line of dinnerware, the value of the dinnerware decreases if it
is sold in non-prestige stores, whether or not discounting is involved.
14. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 33 n.8, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Co.,
548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
In the Mamiya case, as a result of the importation of gray market cameras, employment
was reduced by 60%. Id.
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Unauthorized sales deprive the United States distributor of the
ability to control the nature and quality of the goods. 5 Gray market
goods may not conform to all of the United States safety and technical
requirements, and many of the goods are not regulated by the inspec-
tion, transit and quality controls of the authorized United States dis-
tributor. Goods which are not transported properly, particularly cam-
eras, watches and electronic equipment, may not perform according to
the specifications set by the manufacturer and expected by the buyer.
Consumers are also often unaware when purchasing gray market goods
that they are buying something other than goods marketed by legiti-
mate distributors.16 Thus, it is usually the good will of the United
States distributor which is injured when consumers are dissatisfied
with an item purchased from a gray market dealer. Finally, if major
sales are lost to gray market importers, there may be a serious residual
effect in the service industries associated with authorized United
States distributors.
B. Elements of Unfair Competition
The phenomenon of gray market goods raises the question of
whether dealers in these goods exceed the desirable bounds of competi-
tive behavior. While the presence of gray market goods may provide
intrabrand competition, it does so at the cost of undermining distribu-
tion programs constructed to increase interbrand competition. 1 7 With
little or no financial spending, the gray market dealer is able to reap
the benefits of the substantial investment of the United States distrib-
utor to establish consumer awareness and maintain product quality. In
short, the gray market dealer capitalizes on the good will resulting
from the distribution, marketing, warranties and servicing provided by
the United States distributors. Because of this, the distributor's desire
to design an efficient and effective distribution system may be
impaired.
15. For example, customs regulations require that imported watches be marked on
the inside of their cases. When watches are transported internationally they must be
marked with the name of the importer and country of origin. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982)
(sched. 7, Tariff Schedules of the United States). Watches, a common gray market item,
are delicate precision instruments produced in highly sterile environments to avoid con-
tamination. Thus, they are marked during the course of manufacture in a sensitive envi-
ronment. When gray market dealers open the watches and mark them outside of this
environment, performance is impaired. See Seiko Time Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 218
U.S.P.Q. 560 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1982).
16. See id. (finding of fact number 37).
17. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
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The United States distributor usually spends considerable sums of
money on advertising to develop a product market. 8 If a high quality
image is desired for a product, the long-range marketing strategy may
involve selling only to exclusive stores at the risk of losing revenues
from sales to less prestigious stores. Typically, the United States dis-
tributor is responsible for dealer training, promoting the brand name
in the United States and providing quality inspection, warranties and
repair services. The distributor must also control shipping, handling,
importation and storage of goods.
In addition to being unfair, the "free rider" problem described
above may remove many of the incentives for aggressive interbrand
competition. To the extent that it does so, it may be considered anti-
competitive.
Thus, the presence of gray market goods raises the uneasy specter
of ostensible benefit to the consumer but unfairness to the United
States distributor. The resulting task is to find an equilibrium between
these tensions by satisfying long-term consumer interests while at the
same time protecting the competitive process.
III. LEGAL RESPONSE TO GRAY MARKET GOODS
A. The Nature of the Threatened Interest
The concern of United States trade laws is to foster open competi-
tion, but commercial relationships should not be devoid of legal re-
straints. United States law provides redress against industrial espio-
nage, misappropriation of trade secrets, patent infringement, copyright
infringement, trademark infringement and other tortious acts amount-
ing to unfair competition. These acts interfere with protectable inter-
ests.' 9 In considering the appropriate legal response to the phenome-
non of gray market goods, it is necessary to consider what rights are
being affected and whether any protectable interest is involved.
The importation of gray market goods affects the contractual rela-
tionship between the United States importer/distributor and the for-
eign seller. In most cases the affected agreement is an exclusive distri-
bution agreement. There are numerous legitimate business reasons why
18. For example, in 1981, eight watch companies involved in importing watches
through authorized distribution spent about 50 million dollars on advertising in the
United States. The companies are Seiko Time Corporation, Bulova Watch Co., Citizen
Watch Co. of America, Inc., Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., North American Watch
Corp., Omega Watch Corp., Pulsar Time, Inc. and Rolex Watch U.S.A. See Brief of
Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 8 n. 3 .
19. See generally Developments in the Law, Competitive Torts, 77 H1,RV. L. RVy. 898
(1964).
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a United States distributor and foreign seller would choose to do busi-
ness through an exclusive distribution arrangement."0 The exclusive
United States distributor controls pricing, distribution, advertising and
supply. Where consumer goods are involved, great emphasis is put on
brand image, and control over the marketing strategy is extremely im-
portant. If dealer servicing is an integral part of the product's promo-
tion, a distributor would be reluctant to guarantee proper service un-
less he were assured of exclusive distribution rights.
In most cases the foreign seller desires full penetration of the
United States market. Thus, there is good reason for him to increase
incentives for the United States importer/distributor to commit all
necessary promotional and support services towards this end. Since
many consumer goods ranging from televisions to automobiles are sold
in the United States through authorized distributors of foreign manu-
facturers, consumers often are aware of distribution systems. This
awareness increases consumer identification of certain products with
the United States distributor. It may be important for the foreign
seller to have a healthy business relationship with the United States
distributor since domestic buyers might be reluctant to purchase for-
eign goods which are not supported by a local company.
Exclusive distribution agreements may be protected by the com-
mon law of torts, contracts and unfair competition21 to the extent that
they involve competitive practices, but they must also be viewed within
the framework of antitrust law.
A foreign seller's decision to use an exclusive United States dis-
tributor to market its goods should be treated no differently than a
similar decision by a domestic seller. Exclusive distributorships estab-
lish vertical territorial restrictions which are subject to antitrust scru-
20D. Vertical controls over distribution channels can enhance interbrand competition
by facilitating distribution efficiencies and non-price forms of interbrand competition. In
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977), the Court identified
several beneficial characteristics of vertical restraints. For a discussion of why vertical
restraints might be desirable in the field of international trade, see J. ATWOOD & K.
BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 352-57 (2d ed. 1981). See also
Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. Rsv.
795 (1962).
21. See, e.g., Perry v. American Hecolite Denture Corp., 78 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1935);
Overhamm v. Westall, 66 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1st Dep't 1946). One commentator has argued
that the problem of gray market goods is unquestionably one of unfair competition. "The
disturbance created by the importation of 'genuine' goods in knowing contravention of
an existing lawful distributorship is clearly a tort, and because it is motivated by com-
petitive activity, it is unfair competition in its unvarnished variety." Callman, Another
Look at the Unlawful Importation of Trademarked Articles, 52 TRADE-MARK REP. 556,
561 (1962).
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tiny and the application of a rule of reason." The primary focus of this
standard is an evaluation of both the intrabrand and interbrand com-
petitive impact of the challenged restriction. Whether of foreign or do-
mestic origin, vertical territorial restraints reduce intrabrand competi-
tion. As noted by the Court in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.,2" however, vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition,
which is the primary concern of antitrust law.
. An exclusive distribution arrangement of foreign origin is most
vulnerable when the United States distributor has strong market
power. This is true insofar as an essential element of unlawful conduct
under the rule of reason is proof of market power or the power to raise
prices profitably over the competitive level.24 Without market power,
any attempt to exploit the reduced intrabrand competition resulting
from vertical territorial restraints would be constrained by interbrand
competition from other goods.
On the other hand, the anti-competitive effect of the restriction
decreases if there is a strong competitive United States market. This is
true whether the market is penetrated with domestic or foreign
products.
22. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme
Court recognized the positive competitive purposes served by vertical restrictions in that
they "promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain
efficiencies in the distribution of his product." Id. at 54. The Court observed that with
respect to goods which are trademarked, there is a need to ensure guarantees of service
and repair.
Service and repair are vital for many products, such as automobiles and major
household appliances. The availability and quality of such services affect a man-
ufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. Because of market
imperfections such as the so-called "free rider" effect, these services might not
be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that
each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services then Isic if
none did.
Id. at 55. See generally Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Nonprice
Vertical Restraints, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 11 (1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1977);
ABA ANTITRUST SEC., VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION (Mono-
graph No. 2, 1977). Vertical territorial restraints are permissible absent monopolistic
purpose or anti-competitive effect. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300
(1919); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
23. 433 U.S. 36, 51, 52 n.19 (1977).
24. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HAkR. L. RRv. 9'7 (1991); 2 P. &RRRDn. & D. T3RNE, ANTivrusT LAW § 322
(1978).
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B. Interference With the Contractual Relationship
To the extent that an exclusive distribution agreement is legal
under the rule of reason analysis, it should be considered a protectable
interest. A property right is created in contract, and wrongful interfer-
ence with this right may be an actionable tort.25 The doctrine of inter-
ference with contractual relations is a tort theory used to protect par-
ties to commercial contracts from actions which reduce the value of the
contract or damage its subject matter.2" The theoretical basis for this
doctrine lies in the property aspect of a contract.17 A prima facie case
of intentional interference with a contractual relationship is estab-
lished by proof that (1) the defendant had actual knowledge of the
contract's existence; (2) there is a direct causal connection between the
defendant's act and the damage to the value of the contractual rela-
tionship and (3) there is actual damage or loss.28
Certainly, not all interferences with a competitor's business rela-
tionships are tortious. Competitive pricing is one obvious consequence
of competition and thus is not an actionable interference. Predatory
pricing, disparagement of goods, false advertising and misleading the
consumer with respect to warranties, however, should be considered
tortious interference with a contractual relationship.
It has been suggested that where a competitor has full knowledge
of an exclusive distribution agreement and knows that a foreign manu-
facturer would not sell goods to him under any circumstances, and
25. "Contract rights are property, and as such are entitled to the protection of the
law ... " Second Nat'l Bank v. M. Samuel & Sons, 12 F.2d 963, 967 (1926).
26. Acknowledgment of this tort is found in an article published in 1928 by Professor
Charles E. Carpenter. This may well be the first theoretical exposition of the tort of
interference with contractual relations. Professor Carpenter wrote:
[T]oday there is no question but that there may be prima facie liability for in-
terference with contract relations without inducing breach of contract by, for
example, injuring persons under contract so that they are disabled from per-
forming, or by destroying or damaging property which is the subject matter of a
contract, or by doing other acts which make performance more burdensome, dif-
ficult or impossible or of less or no value to the one entitled to performance
Carpenter, Interference with Contractual Relations, 41 HARV. L. REv. 728, 731 (1928).
Two courts have referred to this passage in upholding causes of action for interference
with contractual relations. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47, 61 (S.D.
Idaho 1962), rev'd, 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom. KLIX Corp. v.
Cable Vision, Inc., 379 U.S. 989 (1965); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols
Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 279
A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
27. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. Crest Distrib., 19 Misc. 2d 426, 428, 190 N.Y.S.2d 748
(19s9).
28. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 129, 927-49 (4th ed. 1971).
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then acts in a manner to refute the existence of the exclusive agree-
ment, the interference cannot be considered incidental. Rather, it
would be motivated by an unlawful intent to interfere with a contrac-
tual relationship.2 9 This property right concept was the basis for relief
in DeJur-Amsco v. Janrus Cameras, Inc.s0 In this case, the plaintiff,
an electronics wholesaler, had obtained a contract with a German elec-
tronics manufacturer to be the exclusive United States distributor of
Grundig dictating and transcribing machines. The defendant, another
United States distributor, began selling similar Grundig machines
which it obtained through European purchasers who obtained them
from Grundig. The defendant's gray market activities were enjoined on
the theory of interference with a contractual relationship.3
C. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 193032 may provide some protec-
tion against the importation of gray market goods s s with respect to
goods which bear trademarks. This statute prohibits the importation of
merchandise that bears a trademark owned by a United States citizen,
corporation or association if the trademark has been registered in the
29. 2 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 9.01 (4th ed.
1982).
30. 16 Misc. 2d 772, 155 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1956).
31. Id. at 774. The court's holding has been criticized since there was no indication or
allegation that the Europeans knew of the exclusive contract between Grundig and the
plaintiff. Note, Interference With Contractual Relations: A Property Limitation, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1406, 1409 (1966).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982) provides:
§ 1526. Merchandise bearing American trade-mark-Importation prohibited
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful
to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if
such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle,
bears a trade-mark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association
created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent
Office by a person domiciled in the United States, under the provisions of
sections 81-109 of Title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of registration of
such trade-mark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in the manner
provided in section 106 of said Title 15, unless written consent of the owner
of such trade-mark is produced at the time of making entry.
Foreigners who own United States trademarks are not entitled to the protection of sec-
tion 526. It has been suggested that this violates the principle of national treatment
under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 1629, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, of which the United States is a member. The Con-
vention provides that the protection of industrial property is to be applied without re-
gard to nationality among nations. See Takamatau, Parallel Importation of Trade-
marked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 433 (1981).
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Patent and Trademark Office and if the Certificate of Registration is
filed with the Secretary of Treasury.3 4 Only trademarks which are reg-
istered under the Trademark Act of 1905,35 or the Principal Register of
the Lanham Act 36 can be used.to prevent importation.
The Tariff Act has been used to exclude spurious goods and cheap
imitations,' 7 as well as genuine goods."8 The Act, however, has been the
subject of much controversy regarding the extent of its protection and
the beneficiaries thereof.3 The Customs Service, which is charged with
enforcing the statute, refuses to exclude goods in those instances where
the United States registrant/distributor is related to the foreign manu-
facturer.40 The Customs Service regulations are based upon a 1969
Treasury Department decision which specifies three situations where
exclusionary protection is not granted: (1) where the foreign producer
is the parent or subsidiary of the United States owner; (2) where the
foreign and United States firms are under common control and (3)
where the foreign producer has been authorized by the United States
owner to produce and sell goods abroad.4' Customs' rationale for its
position is that this is essentially a private contractual situation and
the resources of the Customs Service ought not be involved in policing
such contracts. 2
Some support for Customs' position is found in the legislative his-
tory of section 526, and in a series of antitrust cases brought by the
Justice Department in the 1950's against companies who used section
526 to exclude genuine goods. 3
34. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 130.1 (1981) and related sections.
35. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, amended by Act of July 5, 1946, ch.
540, 60 Stat. 427 (Lanham Act) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982)).
36. The Principal Register of the Lanham Act is its subchapter I, id. §§ 1051-1072.
37. See Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780, 782 (2d Cir. 1916); Coty, Inc.
v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F. 264, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
38. Sturges v. Clark D. Pease Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931).
39. See Bicks, Antitrust and Trademark Protection Concepts in the Import Field,
49 TRADE-MARK REP. 1255 (1959); Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the Bu-
reau of Customs, 57 TRADE-MARK REP. 14 (1967); Atwood, Import Restrictions on
Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADE-MARK REP.
301 (1969).
40. It should be noted that the Customs Service is considering changing its regula-
tions which enforce section 526. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, attachment C (Let-
ter from the Acting Commissioner of Customs to United States Trade Representative
William Brock (November 3, 1982)).
41. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1981).
42. Letter from William E. Brock, United States Trade Representative to the Com-
missioner of Customs, dated Oct. 5, 1980. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, attach-
ment B.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), va-
cated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
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Legal commentators in the pre-GTE Sylvania era have offered ad-
ditional support for Customs' position, and at least one author has ar-
gued that to allow a United States company related to a foreign dis-
tributor to exclude competing imports from that distributor is to
sanction price discrimination." This is hardly a convincing argument
to support Customs' position considering the fact that the indepen-
dent, domestic distributor who is protected by Customs also excludes
competing products.
The legislative history of section 526 is implicated in the Supreme
Court's decision in Bourjois v. Katzel,'" wherein the Supreme Court
held that trademarks could be infringed by the importation and sale of
genuine goods.40 In Bourjois, a French manufacturer of face powder
had sold its business and trademarks to the plaintiff, a United States
company, for $400,000. The United States company continued to im-
port the French powder and sold it in the United States in boxes simi-
lar to the French boxes. The defendant imported the identical powder
and sold it in original French boxes in the United States. The court of
appeals held that because the imported goods were genuine, there
could be no infringement.4 '7 The Supreme Court, however, reversed,
placing great emphasis on the good will value of the trademark which
the plaintiff purchased from the foreign manufacturer. The Court held
that since the French manufacturer could not use its trademark in the
United States, other importers similarly could not be allowed to use it.
The Court also found that the defendant's use of the trademark could
harm the plaintiffs reputation because the public associated the face
powder with the plaintiff.48
44. See Bicks and Dam, supra note 39, and Vandenburgh, supra note 1.
45. 260 U.S. 689 (1923), rev'g 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), aff'g 274 F. 856 (S.D.N.Y.
1920). Detailed discussions of the nexus between section 526 and the Court's decision in
Bourjois are found in Bicks and Atwood, supra note 39; Callman, Unfair Competition
with Imported Trademarked Goods, 43 VA. L. REV. 323 (1957); Derenberg, Current
Trademark Problems in Foreign Travel and the Import Trade: A Critical Analysis of
the Purpose, Scope and Effect of H.R. 7234, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 674 (1959); Kuhn,
Remedies Available at Customs for Infringement of a Registered Trademark, 70 TRADE-
MARK REP. 387 (1980).
46. Commentators differ as to whether Bourjois was intended to overrule pre-Bour-
jois decisions, which held that no trademark infringement occurred where genuine goods
were involved, or whether the case was limited to its facts. Compare Vandenburgh, supra
note 1, and Bicks, Atwood and Kuhn, supra note 44, with Callman and Derenberg, supra
note 44.
47. 275 F. at 543.
48. In Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924), Justice Holmes offered this
explanation as the basis for the Bourjois decision.
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In effect, Bourjois overruled the universality principle of trade-
marks. This principle stated that goods manufactured abroad under a
trademark and then imported and sold in the United States did not
infringe the trademark rights of the American owner since the goods
came from the same foreign source and the public was not deceived.
4 9
This principle complemented the original concept of trademarks as
representing only the physical source or origin of a product." The
Bourjois decision established the principle of territoriality of trade-
marks which holds that the legitimacy of trademark rights depends
upon where the goods are sold. 1
At the same time the appeal of BourJois was pending before the
Supreme Court, section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 first appeared as
an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1922.52 Floor debate in the Senate
was limited to ten minutes, following which section 526 was included as
a midnight amendment.63 Although the legislative history of this sec-
tion is meager, it does show that section 526 was enacted in large part
to overrule the court of appeals' decision in Bourjois and to protect
United States purchasers of trademarks from fraud or breach of con-
tract by foreign sellers against whom contract remedies might be
ineffective. 4
During the mid-1950's, there were extensive efforts to limit section
526 protection to United States trademark owners who were indepen-
dent of foreign manufacturers. The Customs Service changed its regu-
lations to eliminate protection for United States trademark owners
who were related to foreign manufacturers,"5 and several bills were in-
troduced in Congress to prevent affiliated companies from invoking
section 526.11 None of these bills, however, were successful.
49. See Appollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
50. Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 47 VA. L.
Rv. '733 (1961).
51. See Syntax Laboratories, Inc. v. The Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566 (2d
Cir. 1971) (in amending the Trademark Act in 1962 Congress intended to prevent the
use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception of any kind,
not just as related to source).
52. Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 975. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of
1922 was superceded by § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and was repealed by § 651(a)(1)
of the 1930 Act.
53. 62 CONG. REC. 11585, 11602 (Aug. 19, 1922).
54. See Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d at 1037; Coty v. Le Blume Import
Co., 292 F. 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See also Note, Importation Control Under Tariff
Act, Section 526: Trademark Privileges and Antitrust Policy, 67 YALE L.J. 1110, 1111
n.2 (1958).
55. For a discussion of these changes, see Atwood, supra note 39.
56. H.R. 9476, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. 2540, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); Celler
Bill (H.R. 7234), 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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In 1954 the Justice Department filed complaints against four
United States toiletry companies in United States v. Guerlain, Inc.,5"
charging them with the use of section 526 to eliminate intrabrand com-
petition. This was effected by their monopolization and attempted mo-
nopolization of the importation and sale of perfumes bearing the trade-
mark of United States companies.
The defendants in Guerlain were closely associated with a French
manufacturer and had been assigned certain trademark rights in the
merchandise involved in the case. The theoretical basis for the Govern-
ment's case was that the defendant's use of section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 and section 42 of the Lanham Act 5s to exclude genuine
goods violated the Sherman Act since the defendant/importers were
related to the foreign manufacturer. This relationship was character-
ized as a "single international enterprise."59
The district court agreed with the Government's theory and found
the defendants in violation of the Sherman Act. In considering whether
the defendants had monopoly power, the court determined that the
most valuable aspect of a perfume's appeal is a "highly exploited
trademark."60 It then defined the relevant market to be the separate
lines of trademarked perfumes imported by the defendant.61 After de-
fining such a limited market, the court ruled that the defendants exer-
cised monopoly power since they intentionally excluded all competition
under section 526.62 The court interpreted section 526 to be limited to
the facts of Bourjois, namely protection of an independent distributor
against unfair competition from its assignor's continued sale of the
trademarked goods to other importers."3
This decision was appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to 15 U.S.C. section 29.04 The case, while pending decision by the
Supreme Court, was returned to the district court and dismissed with
prejudice on the Government's own motion. 5
57. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
59. 155 F. Supp. at 79.
60. Id. at 85.
61. Id. at 87.
62. Id. at 85.
63. Id. at 80.
64. Under 15 U.S.C. § 529 (1982), when the United States is the complainant for
equitable relief, any appeal from a final judgment falls under §§ 1291 and 2107 of Title
28. Appeal from an interlocutory order must follow §§ 1292(a)(1) and 2107 of Title 28.
Direct appeals to the Supreme Court are possible if made by the district judge of the
case within thirty days of the notice to file an appeal. At the discretion of the Supreme
Court, the case may be sent back to the court of appeals.
65. 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). For a discussion of the rationale for the Gov-
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Despite legislative, judicial and administrative efforts to limit or
abolish it, section 526 remains in force. As a practical matter, however,
the protection this section offers against gray market imports is largely
illusory since the Customs Service limits protection to independent,
domestic distributors." This limitation is not consonant with post-
GTE Sylvania antitrust policy. Section 526 is illogical to the extent
that it is based on fears of price discrimination.
D. The Lanham Act
Trademarked goods receive additional protection through provi-
sions of the Lanham Act."7 Section 42 of the Lanham Act prohibits the
ernment's position, see Bicks, supra note 39.
66. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1982). The regulations provide as follows:
Restrictions on importation of articles bearing recorded trademarks and trade
names.
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic
manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded trade-
mark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohib-
ited importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an actual counter-
feit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles it as to be likely
to cause the public to associate the copying or simulating mark with the re-
corded mark or name.
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation
or association created or organized within the United States are subject to
seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the
same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common owneiship or control
(see §§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner;
(4) The objectionable mark is removed or obliterated prior to importation in
such a manner as to be illegible and incapable of being reconstituted, for exam-
ple by:
(i) Grinding off imprinted trademarks wherever they appear;
(ii) Removing and disposing of plates bearing a trademark or trade name;
(5) The merchandise is imported by the recordant of the trademark or trade
name or his designate; or
(6) The recordant gives written consent to an importation of articles otherwise
subject to the restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, and
such consent is furnished to appropriate Customs officials.
Id.
67. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982) and related sections.
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unauthorized importation of goods which "copy or simulate" a regis-
tered United States trademark.6 Genuine goods are included within
the purview of this section. 69 A trademark owner is permitted to record
a copy of the trademark certificate of registration with the Department
of Treasury so that Customs officials can exclude infringing goods at
the port of entry. The primary difference between section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 and section 42 of the Lanham Act is that section 526
is limited to United States citizens, corporations and associations,"0
while section 42 of the Lanham Act gives protection to a broader class
of persons.
The history of section 42 is not as tortuous as section 526 of the
Tariff Act, yet several judicial and legislative attempts have been made
to limit its impact where genuine goods are involved, primarily for the
same reasons given by those who propose repealing section 526." But,
unlike the controversial section of the Tariff Act, the goals of the Lan-
ham Act are quite clear from its legislative history-to protect the
good will and investment of the owner in a mark, as well as to prevent
consumer confusion.7 2
One commentator has suggested that the true solution to the prob-
lem lies in section 44(h) of the Lanham Act.73 This section gives pro-
tection against unfair competition to any person, whether a citizen, a
domestic corporation or a national of a foreign country which is treaty
bound with the United States. Protection is in the form of analogous
remedies which the Act provides against trademark infringement.7"
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982). "No article of imported merchandise ...which shall
copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
• ..shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States." Id. This sec-
tion provides a United States trademark owner the alternative infringement remedy of
barring importations of all goods which bear an infringing mark. In effect, this section re-
enacted section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, which contained the first statutory
restriction of trademarks on imported articles. It was construed to apply to spurious
goods. Thus, in a series of decisions it was held that the importation and sale of genuine
articles did not constitute trademark infringement. See Appollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F.
18, 20 (1886); Fred Gretsch Mfg. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780, 782 (2d Cir. 1916); Hunyadi
Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861 (2d Cir. 1922).
69. See Bourjois v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923).
70. For a general discussion of the differences between these two sections, see
Callman, supra note 45.
71. See Note, Trademark Infringement: The Power of an American Trademark
Owner to Prevent the Importation of the Authentic Product Manufactured by a For-
eign Company, 64 YALE L.J. 557 (1955).
72. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
73. Callman, Another Look at the Unlawful Importation of Trademarked Articles,
52 TRADE-MARK REP. 556, 562 (1962).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). These remedies may include injunctive relief and the
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This theory has not yet been tested, but it is arguble that section 42 of
the Lanham Act may be invoked to prevent acts of unfair competition
in the importation of gray market goods.
Currently, the most actively sought remedy against gray market
interference is injunctive relief.7" Section 32 of the Lanham Act 6 pro-
vides for injunctions against trademark infringement. Additionally,
courts have permitted trademark infringement actions by exclusive
distributors and sellers of trademarked goods who had contractual
rights to exclude even the owners from selling in a particular
territory.7 7
In the recent case of Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply
Co.,'8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit va-
cated a district court order granting a preliminary injunction against
the importation of gray market cameras manufactured in Hong Kong.
The plaintiff, a Delaware corportion, was the owner of United States
trademark registrations for three Mamiya marks under which it im-
ported and sold photographic equipment in the United States. The
equipment was manufactured in Japan by the Mamiya Company and
sold to a Japanese trading company, who in turn sold it to the plaintiff.
Through contractual arrangements with the Mamiya Company, Japan,
the plaintiff was given the exclusive right to distribute the Mamiya
medium format photographic equipment in the United States.
The defendant imported identical cameras which it purchased in
Hong Kong from sources other than the Mamiya Company, Japan, and
sold them in the United States without the plaintiff's permission at
prices considerably lower than those charged by the plaintiff.79 In re-
sponse to the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the defen-
power to exclude infringing imports.
75. See Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Int'l, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 502 (9th Cir.
1983) (upholding a preliminary injunction to prevent gray market imports); N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 30, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Cf. Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575
F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (motion for preliminary injunction denied relying on
Guerlain).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982).
77. See, e.g., Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiono Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 159 (1st Cir.
1977); G.H. Mumm Champagne v. Eastern Wine Corp., 142 F.2d 499, 500 (2d Cir. 1944);
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Kasser Distillers Products Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1341,
1345 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1972); cf. DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir.
1980) (plaintiff's action for trademark infringement was dismissed based on a finding
that the plaintiff lacked standing since it was not the owner of the trademark in
question).
78. 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983).
79. The defendant solicited camera sales largely by word of mouth, in part because
the prices which it could offer at any given time varied greatly. 548 F. Supp. at 1069.
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dant offered two arguments: first, that no likelihood of confusion, dilu-
tion, or unfair competition was involved since genuine goods were
imported; and second, that injunctive relief would be improper on anti-
trust grounds since the control that the Japanese seller exercised over
the plaintiff turned the plaintiffs trademark rights into an illegal, ver-
tical, territorial restraint.80
The district court observed that the defendant's antitrust claim
was similar to that raised in United States v. Guerlain, but it criticized
Guerlain, stating that its precedential value was questionable in view
of the subsequent vacatur of that case.8 Noting that "the business of
selling Mamiya goods in the United States is the plaintiff's business,
82
the district court found a substantial likelihood of confusion in the de-
fendant's use of the mark in the United States. The court was also
concerned with the plaintiffs ownership of good will associated with
the trademark and the impact of the defendant's use of the mark on
that good will.8" The plaintiff defined the warranty and provided the
repair service for the cameras it sold. Because the defendant's use of
the marks carried none of these assurances, the district court found
that this was "likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff's use of the
mark ' ' " and, as a result, issued a preliminary injunction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dis-
agreed with the district court's finding of consumer confusion and va-
cated the injunction order. The court's opinion, however, did not ad-
dress the substantive issues of the case.8
5
The court emphasized that in order to obtain an injunction in the
Second Circuit there must be a showing of irreparable harm coupled
with either likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions on
the merits, with the balance of hardships tipping in favor of the party
requesting the injunction.86 Bell & Howell failed to make this showing.
Both Bell & Howell's and Masel's goods shared a common origin
of manufacture, and there was no proof that Masel's goods were infer-
ior to those of Bell & Howell. Therefore, the court stated that there
was little, if any, confusion regarding origin of the goods.87
Further, the court did not believe that lack of warranty protection
on the goods sold by Masel constituted sufficient irreparable harm to
80. Id. at 1067-68.
81. Id. at 1074.
82. Id. at 1079.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 719 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 45.
87. Id. at 46.
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support the preliminary injunction. According to the court, consumers
could be alerted to this deficiency by less drastic measures such as la-
beling or advertising.8
In another Lanham Act case involving gray market goods, Seiko
Time Corporation v. Alexander's, Inc., 9 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York enjoined Alexander's De-
partment Store from advertising the availability of gray market
watches at discount prices." The plaintiff in this case was the exclusive
United States distributor of Seiko watches. For several years the de-
fendant purchased its watches from the plaintiff, but in the spring of
1981 it discontinued buying from the United States distributor and be-
gan purchasing the watches from other sources. These watches, how-
ever, were not intended for the United States market.
The defendant advertised the watches at substantial discounts
from what it said were "suggested list" prices and conducted an exten-
sive newspaper "comparative-price advertising" campaign. The
watches were also warranted by the defendant."
In granting the injunction, the court found that the plaintiff made
a "clear showing" that it would probably succeed in proving the follow-
ing claims at trial: (a) the defendant's use of comparisons to the manu-
facturers' suggested list prices in its advertising of plaintiff's foreign-
made watches was a "false representation" under the Lanham Act
since, in most cases, no such prices existed; (b) the defendant adver-
tised the watches in such a manner that implied that they were war-
ranted and would be serviced by the plaintiff and this constituted false
designation of origin under the Lanham Act and (c) the defendant's
advertising and sale of the watches was unfair competition under com-
mon law principles.92
E. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
The importation and sale of gray market goods may also be con-
sidered an unfair act under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,"
which prohibits unfair methods of competition that injure a United
States industry or restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the
United States. An important issue in this area is whether sales and
88. Id.
89. 218 U.S.P.Q. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
90. Id. at 562.
91. 218 U.S.P.Q. at 561.
92. Id.
93. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
[Vol. 5
GRAY MARKET GOODS
warranty efforts in the United States constitute domestic industry.94
Most of the cases brought under section 337 have involved patent
infringement.95 However, the United States International Trade Com-
mission (ITC), which administers the statute, has considered other ac-
tions such as trademark infringement,9 6 trade secret misappropria-
tion, 7  false labeling,98  false designation of origin,9 9  copyright
infringement 0 " and unfair methods of competition. 0 1 A few antitrust
cases have been filed, but all have been terminated without relief.10 2
ITC investigations are adjudicative proceedings subject to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.' Cases are resolved quickly, and this may
be particularly useful with gray market goods. The statute requires
that most cases be decided within one year, or eighteen months if it is
deemed a more complicated case.'" Most cases, however, are con-
cluded within one year.
Preliminary relief is available in the form of temporary exclusion
orders or temporary cease and desist orders pending an investigation,
if the ITC has reason to believe there has been a violation of the sec-
tion. 0 5 A complainant seeking temporary relief is entitled to have the
hearing before the administrative law judge completed within three
months of the institution of the investigation. 0
In determining what constitutes an unfair act in the importation
94. In Schaper Manufacturing Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm., 717 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.
1983), the court held that although the inventor and exclusive licensee to manufacture
and market a toy were active within the United States, because the toy was manufac-
tured under contract with the licensee in Hong Kong, there was no domestic industry
under section 337.
95. For example, in Fischer and Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930),
the court held that the importation of an infringing patent was an unfair act under sec-
tion 337. Since that time, first the Tariff Commission and now the International Trade
Commission (ITC), established in 1976 and superceding the Tariff Commission, 19
U.S.C. % 1330 (1982), has been a forum for patent disputes.
96. See Reclosable Plastic Bags, Inv. No. 337-TA-22, ITC Pub. 801 (Jan. 1977).
97. Apparatus for the Continuous Production of Copper Rod, Inv. No. 337-TA-52,
ITC Pub. 1017 (Nov. 1979).
98. See Solder Removal Wicks, Inv. No. 337-TA-26, ITC Pub. 823 (July 1977).
99. Novelty Glasses, Inv. No. 337-TA-55, ITC Pub. 991 (July 1979).
100. Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
87, ITC Pub. 1160 (June 1981).
101. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, ITC Pub. 1616 (Sept.
1983).
102. See generally Schaumberg, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as an Anti-
trust Remedy, 27 ANTITRUsT BULL. 51 (1982).
103. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
104. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 210.15 (1984).
105. 19 U.S.C. % 1337(e) (exclusion oydey), (f)l) (cease and desist ordeT) (1982).
106. 19 C.F.R. § 210.41(e)(2) (1980).
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of goods, the ITC will consider judicial determinations under other un-
fair competition acts.10 7 There must be a causal connection between
the importation of gray market goods and injury to an industry which
is efficiently and economically operated. This connection may be
demonstrated by showing such evidence as specific lost sales of the do-
mestic article to imports, the effects of the sales of the imported items
on the profitability, pricing and costs of employment in the domestic
industry and similar market data.'0 8
If it can be shown that predatory pricing is involved with the sale
of gray market goods, there may be relief under section 337. This is
also designed to prevent unfair methods of competition, the effect or
tendency of which is to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in
the United States.10 9 The ITC has held that predation is established
when prices fall below average variable costs or below short-run, profit
maximizing prices and barriers to entry are high enough to let the
predator reap the benefits of predation before new entry occurs. 10
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it has the appearance of benefiting the consumer, the
phenomenon of gray market goods is, for the most part, a species of
unfair competition. Where an exclusive distribution contract between
foreign and domestic entities enhances interbrand competition and sat-
isfies a rule of reason analysis, it should be considered a protectable
property interest. There is little justification for permitting gray mar-
ket imports to interfere with that interest by taking advantage of the
good will associated with the distribution, marketing, warranties and
servicing provided by the United States distributor.
The antitrust goal of promoting long-run consumer interests is not
advanced by conduct which misleads consumers as to warranties and
servicing, by false advertising and by disrupting distribution systems
geared towards increasing interbrand competition. This type of con-
107. See Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C.L. REv. 227 (1980).
108. See Kaye & Plaia, Developments in Unfair Trade Practices in International
Trade: A Review of the Third and Fourth Years Under Section 337 as Amended by the
Trade Act of 1974, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'¥ 115 (1979).
109. The restraint of trade and commerce language in section 337 is based on section
one of the Sherman Act. Unlike the Sherman Act, however, it contains no requirement of
concerted action. Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, Inv. No. 337-TA-69, ITC Pub. 1126,
at 6 (Jan. 1981).
110. See Chicory Root-Crude and Prepared, Inv. No. 337-TA-27, ITC Pub. at 9
(Oct. 1976). See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Reuisited, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 289, 289-330
(1980).
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duct exceeds the desirable bounds of competitive behavior.
The competitive process suffers unless there is a commercial envi-
ronment amenable to efficiency and progress. To the extent that gray
market goods impede the incentive for vigorous interbrand competi-
tion, they imperil this process.

